Prohibition’s Pending Demise: Internet Gambling & United States Policy by Koenig, K. Alexa

Prohibition’s Pending Demise:
Internet Gambling & United States Policy
By K. Alexa Koenig*

Abstract: In this article, I posit that the United States is on the verge of a dramatic transformation with respect to its Internet gambling policy. Because of a sudden, renewed interest in harnessing online gambling profits for state benefit due to the current recession, there is a pressing and significant need for information about online gambling.  This article provides an overview of the history of United States policy with respect to gambling, and illustrates the factors that must be met if widespread policy change is to succeed.

I.	Introduction
In 2006, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA),​[1]​ which forbids the transfer of funds from financial institutions to Internet gambling websites.  The Act effectively ushered in an era of Prohibition for online gambling.  
All but invisible when it passed on the very day Congress adjourned, the UIGEA slipped in under the radar, becoming law only as a rider to the SAFE Port Act.​[2]​ Notably, the SAFE Port Act, which had been authored to provide greater security at U.S. ports, passed the House and Senate without any mention of the UIGEA.  Instead, the UIGEA was added in a separate conference report whose reading was waived.  On October 13, the SAFE Port Act was signed into law by then-President Bush, the UIGEA silently becoming law along with it.​[3]​
Two theories persist as to the policy motivations that underlay the UIGEA’s attachment to the Safe Port Act, and its passage.  The first is that the Act reflected a moral censure of gambling and gamblers.  The second is that the Act’s passage was a protectionistic gesture in favor of U.S. gambling and related interests, and thus more financially motivated.  The following article investigates the history of U.S. gambling policy to illustrate why, contrary to surface appearances, the latter theory is the more probable, since U.S. gambling policy has always been more pecuniary than morality based.  This article also argues that the Act, which passed so quickly and quietly just a handful of years ago, is destined for an equally sudden death, with the United States teetering on the edge of a dramatic overhaul of its Internet-gambling policy.
*	*	*
In 1951, households across America were riveted to television sets in homes, bars, and restaurants as notorious and lesser-known mob bosses paraded across the screen, admitting their role in organized crime syndicates whose tentacles burrowed deep across the nation.  The televised Kefauver Committee Hearings, special Senate hearings coordinated to investigate organized crime operations, revealed to the world both the existence of the Mafia, and the enormous political and economic profits it had reaped from a near-monopoly on illegal gambling.  As part of the investigation, the Committee found that the Mafia (and the normally law-abiding citizens who frequented the Mafia’s gambling establishments) demonstrated little concern for the law and law enforcement.​[4]​ 
Having originally benefited from bootlegging, an industry made less profitable with the end of Prohibition in 1933, the Mafia had turned to gambling as the latest illicit industry of choice; an industry through which staggering sums of money could be made.  A former member of the United States Treasury’s Intelligence Unit testified that the Reinfeld Syndicate alone had collected a conservatively-estimated yet mind-boggling sum of $60,000,000 from its former illegal liquor distributorships.​[5]​  However, this number would be eclipsed by the profits the syndicate made from the numbers racket. Although Abner Zwillman, a major player within the syndicate, had publicly committed himself to a vice-free life following his days as a bootlegger, the Kefauver hearings revealed that his operations had merely shifted to an even more lucrative forum: gambling.​[6]​
*           *          *
Nearly six decades later, gambling holds a very different place in the nation’s consciousness.  For most Americans, despite its extreme profitability for gaming operators, gambling is not high on the list of societal concerns—hence the potential for passing the UIGEA so quietly.  Just in terms of post-tax profits awarded to the house, legal gambling is now an estimated $94 billion industry.​[7]​ When the total amount wagered is considered, the size of legal gambling explodes: in 1996, it was estimated that Americans gambled $586 billion; by 1999, that number had risen to $637 billion.​[8]​  These figures do not even begin to account for illegal betting, which remains the staggering majority of gambling worldwide. 
The illegal gambling industry may have a worth ten times that of illegal drugs.​[9]​  Yet gambling appears to have far less salience than drugs, both for criminal policy and the public more generally.  While drugs and gambling were both considered vices as recently as the mid-20th century, American attitudes towards gambling have shifted radically in recent years: the attendant rate of not only decriminalization, but legalization, has been staggering. 
	This combined moral-legal change has been unparalleled within the field of vice.  Certainly, during the very same decades during which the United States was waging its “war on drugs,” its hard-line position against recreational betting was crumbling.  What accounts for this difference? And what does it mean for the future of U.S. gambling policy, and especially the burgeoning field of online betting?  
More than ten years ago, Peter William Moran argued that gambling had achieved legitimization.​[10]​  Yet continued unease around some forms of gaming suggests that conclusion is not so easily reached.  The primary example of this is Internet gambling, which, in contrast to other gambling forms, has entered a “prohibition era.”​[11]​  To understand why internet gambling has been treated so differently from other forms of gambling, it is important to investigate the conditions under which gambling is no longer considered a vice.  This reveals the logic behind government gambling policies, and helps to predict future acceptance of diverse gambling practices.  
A comparison between Internet gambling and another rapidly growing subcategory of gambling—Native American gaming—provides some indication as to where we have been, where we are, and where we are headed.  Considering divergent policies with respect to these two subcategories sheds light on contemporary American attitudes toward gambling, as well as our policy options regarding the eventual destigmatization of online gaming.  In this article, I demonstrate how the Internet casino backlash, like resistance to most gambling practices, has not been driven by moral concerns, but by more practical interests.  Because of this pragmatic focus, I forecast a dramatic about-face with respect to Internet gambling policy once certain technological concerns have been met.  Such a turnaround would be much less likely (and much less sudden) if today’s prohibition was truly morally motivated.
In Part II of this paper, I discuss the definition of vice, and compare the legal and moral trajectories of various gambling practices with those of other vices to explore why gambling has taken such a divergent path. In Part III, I discuss the history of modern-era federal gambling policy to establish a foundation for my argument that Internet gambling policy is likely to change quite radically in the coming years.  I also compare the Indian gaming and Internet gambling subfields, to illustrate my argument that gambling policy has not been driven by morality concerns, but monetary ones.​[12]​ Finally, Part IV offers my predictions as to where I think the United States is headed with respect to its Internet gambling policies. 
Ultimately, I conclude that three factors help explain the lessening of moral anxiety about gambling, and thus dictate when gambling will be found acceptable. These three factors are 1) the existence of defined geographic limitations, 2) stringent regulatory oversight, and 3) linking gambling profits to a charitable or domestic government purpose.  As discussed below, these factors have major implications for the future of U.S. gambling policy, especially with respect to Internet gambling, gambling’s “final frontier.”  
II.	Vice and Vice Policy in the United States
a.	What is a vice?
The most logical place to begin discussing the “de-vicing” of gambling and its attendant legalization is to clarify what a vice is. Traditionally, the term “vice” has been used to reference crimes related to sodomy, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, pornography, and gambling.​[13]​  In our system of criminal laws, such activities are often referred to as “victimless crimes”—those crimes for which there are no complaining witnesses.​[14]​  However, the term “vice” can also mean “the willing exchange, among adults, of strongly demanded, but legally proscribed, goods or services.”​[15]​  Black’s Law Dictionary defines vice alternately as “[a] moral failing,” and “[w]ickedness; corruption.”​[16]​  These last two definitions explicitly link vice to immorality, as well as hint at why stringent regulation may help to destigmatize vice: by eliminating, or at least lessening, the chance for corruption that lies at the heart of vice’s very definition.  
b.	Policy trends with respect to the various vices 
Each vice has a unique social and legal history.  While numerous articles could be authored about the policy fluctuations of each (and have been), a brief overview of our nation’s approach to the various vice crimes is helpful to contrast, and thus help explain, the United States’ unprecedented moral and legal softening toward gambling. 
The greatest divergence in America has occurred between drugs and gambling.  Even as the United States intensified its “war on drugs” during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, gambling broadened in both acceptability and respectability.  One possible key to their very different trajectories may be the disparate concerns of government.  With gambling, the harms to the state are arguably nominal, and if anything, may be outweighed by the financial benefits. For example, the rate of pathological gambling is less than one percent; this jumps to 6.2 percent for drug dependence.​[17]​  Thus, the relative prevalence of harm is arguably less with gambling than drugs.  The pathological use of any practice or substance creates costs for the state through a need for additional regulation, policing, health services, etc., and thus becomes an issue of state concern.  In addition to prevalence, casinos finance a number of services to combat pathological gambling; by contrast, the costs of dealing with drug addiction fall heavily on government entities.
Otherwise, though, both drugs and gambling have a lot in common: both anti-drug and anti-gambling laws are particularly hard to enforce (although casino gambling may be somewhat less so than drugs, since casinos are often much harder to hide than drugs). Both share high consumer demand and can be extraordinarily lucrative.  Both also have historic ties to organized crime.  
However, a second key to the disparate policy trajectories may be our federalist system and the level of government involved. Whether local, state or federal government is charged with regulating a particular vice is a determining factor as to how policy is created, and thus may influence what policies are created.​[18]​ For example, gambling policy has emerged as a byproduct of state experimentation with a federal “trump.”  This is especially true in the Indian gaming context, where the national Congress has ultimate control over Indian gaming but has largely delegated details to the states under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).​[19]​ This same pattern is evident with Internet gambling and the recent passage of the UIGEA, which makes violation of individual state Internet gambling laws a federal crime.​[20]​ Further, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 made numerous violations of State gambling laws federal offenses.​[21]​  Thus, states have maintained their dominant role in establishing day-to-day gambling policy, while illicit drug policy has largely remained the domain of the federal government.
Having states control the progress of gambling policy has facilitated significant experimentation, something from which drug policy has yet to benefit.  States have been able to learn from each other’s mistakes and recognize which forms of criminalization or regulation are most effective for protecting citizens, while maximizing profits.  Most states have concluded that there is little advantage to criminalizing gambling. This is largely because people do not stop gambling when it is illegal, and the very fact of illegality has historically skyrocketed the involvement (and profits) of organized crime.​[22]​  This leaves morality as the major consideration for those states that have chosen not to legalize.  
But can morality be enough of a reason to maintain gambling’s illegality?  Should the law be used as a symbolic resource to denounce certain practices, even if, for all practical purposes, those practices cannot be constrained? Utah and Hawaii have clearly answered such questions in the affirmative.​[23]​  For many other states, however, witnessing the tremendous financial success of relatively liberal gambling policies in other jurisdictions has encouraged legal gambling even in formerly reluctant territories.  By contrast, federal control over national drug policy has permitted far less experimentation and flexibility, potentially hindering the opportunity to explore a variety of possible best practices.
A quick consideration of additional vices further demonstrates how inconsistent our nation has been in terms of locating plaintiff-less crimes along a morality/legality continuum. Sodomy is the one vice that has experienced a moral and legal transformation close to gambling.  However, the transformation is nowhere near complete.  Gay marriage, the arguable offspring of the sodomy debate, remains a more salient issue than anything gaming related, as evidenced by the enormous battles that have recently raged in California and elsewhere over gay marriage.​[24]​  The results of several political campaigns highlight this divergence.  For example, the overwhelming passage of Propositions 5 and 1A,​[25]​ two tribal government-driven political campaigns that collectively legalized Indian gaming in California, suggests the extent to which vice and gambling have been decoupled in the popular psyche. While some of the support for Indian gaming may have been due to a show of support for tribal industry and not necessarily gambling per se, any moral outrage against gambling was clearly too weak to act as a trump.  Gay marriage, by contrast, recently failed in California,​[26]​ suggesting that issues related to sodomy remain more contested terrain.​[27]​
The legal and moral trajectories of gambling and prostitution have especially diverged: prostitution has remained illegal throughout much of U.S. history,​[28]​ even as the discourse surrounding prostitution has changed with the various phases of the feminist movement. This may be tied, in part, to the U.S.’s longstanding Puritanistic concern with all things sexual.​[29]​  Prostitution is, by its definition, tied even more intimately to sex than porn (the latter of which, at least for consumers, is a mere characterization of the real thing). Adult pornography, by contrast, has been largely decriminalized, experiencing a legal transformation much like gambling.  However, it has not proceeded as far along the road to destigmatization.​[30]​ As pointed out by Professors Franklin Zimring and Bernard Harcourt, “[T]he moral transformation of pornography in society and government is nowhere near as dramatic [as with gambling].  No state government would sponsor an adult entertainment Web site as governments now support and advertise lotteries.”​[31]​
The contrast between the levels of government control for porn, prostitution and gambling may especially explain the variance in U.S. attitudes, law and policy.  While porn has been decriminalized by the federal Supreme Court,​[32]​ prostitution is generally a municipal concern.  Gambling, by contrast, is controlled by states. The extreme decentralization of prostitution policing makes formal, wide-scale change less likely from a practical standpoint, and more costly from a strategic one.  Federal regulation, while capable of tremendously broad influence, is far less likely to result in experimentation, as noted above.  Thus, state regulation may provide the most ideal balance between experimentation, caution, and national visibility to influence broad-based policy change.​[33]​
Yet another consideration with respect to policy change may be the underlying substance of the argument.  Several vices that have become decriminalized have done so based on a “rights” argument (that fundamental rights are invaded when certain practices are criminalized); the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the sodomy laws​[34]​ and the decriminalization of porn are two particularly notable examples.  Such a frame has not been applied to gambling: no one has successfully asserted a fundamental right to game.  Instead, the argument in favor of the increased legalization of gambling has been an instrumental one: since gambling cannot be stopped, the practice might as well be used to generate revenue for government or charitable purposes. This suggests instrumental arguments may have particular salience for the decriminalizing of certain vices.
Another issue to consider is international context.  While the United States has tried to maintain its autonomy with respect to gambling policy, this has proven almost impossible, especially with the spread of Internet gambling.  Just six decades ago, gambling was criminalized in almost every western country:​[35]​ those restrictions have been enormously relaxed in recent years.  Decriminalization has spread across the globe, as countries struggle to keep gambling dollars from flooding into neighboring, less restrictive nations.
Perhaps, as some have speculated, our concern with vice really comes down to a moral crisis over nonproductive pleasure – a crisis that reflects our nation’s Puritanistic roots and an ethic that favors hard work.  This has some resonance when comparing drugs with gambling: while some drugs may make individuals more productive over the short term (because they relax the individual or stimulate the individual to increase efficiency), this probably does not hold true for the bulk of drugs, at least with heavy use.  By contrast, gambling can more easily be viewed as productive, especially when profits are harnessed for government or other non-profit programs. The pattern of gambling legalization certainly supports this perspective: where funds are generated for government programs, as with state lotteries that allocate revenue toward schools and other state services, they have been strongly supported.  The debate over medical marijuana, the drug that has the greatest likelihood of legalization, further supports this “functionalist” theory: with medical marijuana, the most powerful argument for legalization has been the purported ability of the drug to stimulate appetites among chemotherapy, AIDS and other patients, again suggesting the relative strength of a functionalist frame. 
Even in early Massachusetts, the homestead of American Puritanism, gambling was maligned not because of immorality (as often presumed), but because “it was an idle waste of time.”​[36]​  When diving into historical attitudes about the evils of gambling, it quickly becomes evident that the denigration of gambling has rarely been based on concepts of immorality or sin (even the bible is replete with gambling references), but the fact that gambling does not produce anything. This is reflected in the historic fact that the wealthy have often been immune from gambling-related stigma, due to their better ability to sustain losses; the same cannot be said of the poor.  This discrimination is evident as early as Roman times, when “if a man were wealthy, Romans accepted his gambling with a smile, but castigated a poor man who indulged in such a shameful hobby.”​[37]​
III.	An Overview of U.S. Gambling Policy
a.	United States Gambling Policy 
Four documents shed further light on the practical concerns of government, and the conditions under which gambling is legalized.  They also highlight the role that government policy has played in the moral and social destigmatization of gambling, and consequently, gambling’s increased acceptance.  These are 1) the 1951 Kefauver Report; 2) the 1976 Final Report of the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling; 3) the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report; and 4) the 2003 General Accounting Office Internet Gambling Overview.
i.	1951 Kefauver Committee Report
Clues to the pragmatic foundation of gambling policy are evident throughout 1951’s Kefauver Committee Final Report. The focus of the report was organized crime; the goal of the Committee was to figure out what to do about it.  A shift from a national concern with alcohol to gambling and then quickly to drugs is glaringly evident, as demonstrated by the following passage: 
From every corner of the country there came rumblings of an insidious evil beginning to eat its way into the fiber of the Nation's youth. Shocking stories [have reached] the committee of young people, confused and unnerved, turning to the use of narcotic drugs, either as a form of pleasure or as an escape from psychological strains they could not master. … These young victims were the innocent prey of the lowest form of criminal known to society, the drug peddler. … It seemed clear to the committee that if its legislative program should be successful in driving organized gangster syndicates out of the field of gambling, these racketeers would ultimately turn to other forms of illegal business activity just as they had turned from bootlegging to monopolized gambling. Many a hoodlum has stated with pride that he had never stooped to the sale of drugs, but he said that only because gambling was a sufficiently profitable source of income. Deprived of gambling, he would have no difficulty in adjusting his resilient conscience to the sale of drugs. No better example of this can be found than the case of Waxey Gordon, once notorious bootlegger, then a racketeer gambler, and recently arrested for drug peddling.  The evils of monopolized gambling are great. Many a family has been driven to poverty and many a child has been unnecessarily deprived of life's opportunities because his parents, tempted by a distant hope of sudden wealth but ignorant of the enormity of the odds against them, have gambled away the family's pay envelope. But these evils are nothing compared with the sorrow and tragedy to individuals and families alike resulting from drug addiction.​[38]​

Thus, the committee acknowledged that while gambling could lead to harm, such harm was not particularly overwhelming, at least with respect to other vices with which the nation was concerned.
Another passage from the Kefauver Report suggests that gambling’s general acceptance may have been facilitated by the shift in attention to drugs, and that perhaps gambling was not considered immoral, even then.  Specifically, the committee declared that
[t]he question is not whether gambling or any other form of illegal activity is morally good or bad. It is, rather, that we must weigh the full evil effects upon the body politic of permitting powerful groups of criminals to utilize the channels of interstate commerce for the purpose of controlling illegal enterprises, when it is clear that these groups now obtain and always have secured their power by (1) using violence and intimidation; (2) attempting to corrupt and control local government; and (3) obtaining overbearing economic power by amassing great wealth through nonpayment of taxes and by means of monopoly.​[39]​

Thus, even in 1951, who was profiting from gambling and how may have been more important to gambling policy than gambling itself.  However, well-publicized connections between gambling and the Mafia did feed on latent concerns about a link between gambling and crime. The Kefauver hearings and the arrow they drew between the Mafia and gambling have been credited with helping to defeat legalized gambling proposals then being considered in four states.​[40]​  However, over the next several decades, as 1) the government increasingly turned its attention to drug policy, 2) gambling became more popular among the middle class, and 3) casinos started being publicly traded (reducing Mafia ownership), any hard line stance against gambling crumbled.
ii.	1976 Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling​[41]​
In 1976, after three years of research and hearings, the U.S. Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling issued a final report on the “controversial and divisive” subject of gambling.​[42]​  The commission’s goal was to 1) report on current gambling practices in the United States, and 2) discuss the possible consequences of legalizing various forms of gambling, in order to recommend “a fair and reasonable national policy toward the existence of gambling.”​[43]​  
	The commission concluded that “contradictory gambling policies and a lack of resources combine to make effective gambling law enforcement an impossible task under present conditions.  Not ‘difficult’—not ‘frustrating’—not even ‘almost impossible’—but impossible.”​[44]​  Because of this conclusion, as well as their discovery that approximately 80 percent of Americans approved of gambling (characterized as a “national phenomenon”), they recommended that most forms of gambling be legalized.​[45]​  
	However, the commission did warn that “the two principle goals of legalized gambling – revenue raising and crime control – are incompatible.”​[46]​  They agreed that to undercut illegal gambling, states would have to offer competitive odds and payoffs, potentially by eliminating taxes on bettors and operators.  Ultimately, they left it to States to determine which goal to pursue​[47]​ in light of the ability of states to be “flexible and responsive to local demands.”​[48]​  The responsibility of the federal government, per the Commission, would ideally be to “take care not to hinder State efforts to compete with illegal gambling operations” per the exercise of its regulatory and tax powers.​[49]​  Instead of prohibiting lottery sales and other gambling activities in interstate commerce, the Commission recommended that the federal government “stand ready to assist any State when the facilities of interstate commerce are being used to promote interference with that State’s lottery policies.”​[50]​  They also found that “the Federal income tax on gambling winnings is the single greatest obstacle to effective competition with illegal gambling operations,” and that any taxes that were imposed should be levied by the States.  They also recommended that low-level gambling offenses be removed from criminal jurisdiction, arguing that civil remedies would be more effective in controlling gambling than the current criminal statutes.
	The commission also rejected the argument that organized crime controlled all illegal gambling.  They posited that independent illegal gambling businesses, unlike organized crime syndicates, should be largely left alone by Federal law enforcement investigations.​[51]​ Further stressing the need for the federal government to back off of gambling regulation, the commission suggested that Congress refrain from passing a bill to abolish interstate wagering, which was then being considered.
	The commission noted that many states were “attempting to promote and suppress gambling at the same time,” and that neither of these objectives was successfully being met, since gambling that was permitted tended to increase citizen participation in illegal gambling.  Evidence of the disparate enforcement of public gambling laws against African-Americans further prompted the commission to recommend that such public gambling laws be abolished.  
With respect to demographics, the commission’s survey revealed that most gamblers were white, and that gambling participation rose with income and education.​[52]​ However, the situation for illegal betting was quite different, with the white-nonwhite difference reversed.​[53]​  While the commission did uncover some evidence that gambling expenditures were regressive, the commission concluded that gambling was no more regressive than states’ sales tax.​[54]​
	Citizen attitudes were also measured.  Most Americans believed gambling enforcement was less important than enforcing laws against public drunkenness, prostitution or pornography.​[55]​  Other offenses that were believed to be more salient than illegal gambling included the dealing of heroin, drunk driving, burglary, car theft, the purchase of stolen property, and the sale of marijuana.  Interestingly, even a rampant (albeit mistaken) belief that organized crime maintained its hold on illegal wagering did not appear to undermine gambling’s relative popularity.​[56]​
	The commission found that resistance, when it occurred, predominately preceded the introduction of legalized games in a community: “Once it is legalized and functioning… gambling receives overwhelming support for its continued operation.”​[57]​ A chart detailed the percent of people who held positive attitudes toward legalizing particular games.  This ranged from a high of 68 percent for Bingo to a low of 16 percent for high school sports betting.  State lotteries, by comparison, had a 61 percent favorability rating, with casinos and slot machines at 40 percent.​[58]​
	The commission also considered the prevalence of problem gambling, and how that would be impacted by legalization.  In contrast to Gamblers Anonymous, which claimed an estimated six to nine million problem gamblers nationwide (with no basis for their figures), the Commission found that less than one percent of national survey participants showed signs of being “probable” compulsive gamblers, which, projected forward, would suggest a relatively tiny 1.1 million compulsive gamblers across the country.​[59]​
	The commission further considered gambling’s history, especially within the state of Nevada, to argue for its increased legalization. Noting that gambling had once been considered both a respectable pastime and profession, the Commission explained that tough antigambling laws had predominately been established in response to a strong movement by the women of Nevada, who had been “uniformly excluded from all gambling activities.”​[60]​  These tough laws did not have the intended effect, however: instead of stopping gambling in the state, they merely created a thriving black market, as gambling operations were driven underground.  Instead of licensing fees accruing to the state, profits supported gamblers “skilled in the arts of cheating and bribing public officials.”​[61]​  The Commission further explained that in the late 19th century,  “powerful machine politicians skillfully exploited the sentiments of different sections of the public. … A movement to legalize gambling in Chicago, San Francisco, New Orleans, New York, or any other city… would have been roundly defeated, not only because of the underlying social and moral taboos still attached to the activity, but because it would have meant a possible end to the lucrative pipeline of payoffs to police and lawmakers.”​[62]​  Thus, a strong anti-gambling stance protected the profits so tightly tied to gambling’s continued illegality. 
	As for illicit betting more generally, the Commission found that sports betting was the leading form of illegal gambling in the United States.​[63]​  The typical sports better was a white male, 18 to 44, with some college education, earning a relatively high income, and living in the Northeast or North Central U.S.  They also found that more was wagered per sports bettor than any other category of gambler.​[64]​ While the commission ultimately recommended against legalizing sports wagering, that exception was primarily based on then-existing federal tax laws that made it impossible for legal games to compete with illegal games. The commission explained that fears of game-fixing (which remains the predominate concern today) “are exaggerated in view of the extensive amount of illegal wagering already taking place today on professional team sports.”​[65]​
iii.	1999 National Gambling Impact Study
The 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, released two decades later, is similarly notable for its relative sidelining of gambling’s immorality and its focus on pragmatic concerns. The report came on the later end of the transformation of gambling from vice to (potential) virtue, operating not as a vehicle through which to change the course of history, but as a process through which Americans could feel better about that change.  Thus, it ultimately functioned as what U.C. Berkeley Professor Franklin Zimring has termed a “ceremony of adjustment.”  In the Report, the commission underscored the “complete about-face from [gambling’s] prohibition to promotion” that had recently taken place in one state after another.​[66]​  The commission also explained that by the late 1990s, lotteries had become a virtual government monopoly, as well as the most widespread form of gambling in the United States.​[67]​  
The 1999 commission further declared that casinos on Indian reservations and riverboat and dockside casinos, which had provided new geographically-bounded gambling territories, had been “the most significant development in the industry.”​[68]​  Casinos were lauded as “an important source of entertainment, jobs, and income.”​[69]​  The most stinging criticism was reserved for sports wagering, just as it had been in 1976, because of an “alleged increase in the involvement of organized crime,” as well as its potential threat to the “integrity of sports,” and its supposed negative impact on student athletes and adolescent gamblers.​[70]​ 
The commission repeatedly emphasized gambling’s potential threat to college students, 23 percent of whom purportedly gambled at least once a week.​[71]​ This concern with youth suggests that the United States may have internalized John Stuart Mill’s “do no harm” principle as central to its gambling policy.  Under Mill’s philosophy, adults should be free to engage in activities that do not harm others; an exception is made for children, who cannot be expected to make wise choices for their own welfare.​[72]​ Thus, while adults should have relative freedom to engage in activities that are not harmful to others, it is appropriate to protect children from such dangers. Paralleling this perspective, gambling’s moral and legal relaxation had not extended to young Americans.  In most jurisdictions, then as today, individuals had to be 21 years old to gamble. 
	The Report’s fifth chapter specifically dealt with the then-emergent issue of Internet gambling.  It stressed the difficulty of states to regulate or prohibit Internet gambling, and explained that “several states have concluded that only the federal government has the potential to [do so].”​[73]​  The Commission ultimately recommended “1) that the federal government prohibit any Internet gambling not already authorized and encourage foreign governments not to harbor Internet gambling organizations, and 2) that Congress pass legislation prohibiting the collection of credit card debt for Internet gambling.”​[74]​  However, an orchestrated federal effort to limit Internet gambling did not materialize in any significant way until years later, when Congress passed the UIGEA.  
Ultimately, despite concerns about Internet gambling, sports gambling, and restrictions on youth participation, the Commission emphasized the benefits and downplayed the negatives associated with the “former” vice. 
iv.	2002 General Accounting Office Report on Internet Gambling
In 2002, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report focused on the only truly salient gambling issue left: Internet gambling.  Notably, the concern was framed not as a moral one, but one with very practical considerations.  The report’s purpose was to reveal the potential for using the nation’s payment system, especially credit cards, to restrict online gambling.​[75]​  The GAO began its “Results in Brief” section of the report by stressing that “Internet gambling is an essentially borderless activity that poses regulatory and enforcement challenges.”​[76]​ 
The GAO also noted that unlike in the U.S., “Internet gambling has been legalized in over 50 countries and jurisdictions, mostly in Europe, the Caribbean, and the Australia/Pacific region.”​[77]​  The GAO concluded that stopping citizens from betting by restricting the use of credit cards had largely proved futile; as noted in the report, restrictions had just had the effect of encouraging “newer forms of payment, such as e-cash.”​[78]​  Perspectives on whether Internet gambling could be effectively used for money laundering, another concern, were found to be mixed: while law enforcement cited “the volume, speed and international reach of Internet transactions and the offshore locations of Internet gambling sites” to support their contention that laundering posed a real threat, banking and gaming regulatory officials disagreed.  The latter suggested that there was no more risk of money laundering through Internet gambling than any other form of e-commerce.​[79]​  Ultimately, the GAO issued no recommendations,​[80]​ merely providing what evidence it could to support diverse perspectives.
b.	Factors that Drive United States Gambling Policy
In the next section, I argue that history and policy suggest three factors predominately dictate whether gambling practices are embraced or rejected by the American public.  I also argue that these three factors at least partially explain why Internet gambling has proven the exception to a general pattern of gambling acceptance.  
First, to garner widespread support, gambling must be geographically constrained.  This is mirrored in the geographic containment of most commercial casino gambling to specific territorial confines within Reno, Las Vegas and Atlantic City.  Tribal gaming, largely restricted to Indian reservations, further reflects this trend.  NIMBYism​[81]​ is a pervasive response to casino gaming, and one of the biggest hurdles faced by tribes that seek to open casinos.​[82]​  By contrast, Internet gambling has been perceived as essentially borderless, creeping not only into local towns, but individuals’ homes.  While many Americans—indeed, most humans—appear to engage in some form of gambling, it seems they want to make sure that they are in control of gambling, and not the other way around: hence the desire to limit gambling facilities to relatively remote locations.  Even pro-gambling advocates appear to want their casinos close, but not too close. 
	Second, to further “neutralize” the stigma that gambling carries, gambling profits must be linked to a charitable or domestic government purpose.  This may work by providing a moral counterweight to gambling.  The role that tying gambling to charitable and government purposes plays in its popularization is reflected in the worldwide, historic phenomenon of favoring lotteries that support government coffers:  today, there is a near-government monopoly on lotteries.  This is also evident with tribal gambling, whose proceeds are mandated by Congress to serve the economic development of tribal governments.​[83]​  While not all gambling has been linked to such welfare-serving purposes, it is when such connections have occurred that resurgences in gambling’s acceptance has flourished.  With Internet gambling, profits not only line private pocketbooks, but pocketbooks located overseas.
	Third, gambling has garnered its greatest legitimacy when subject to strict regulation.  Evidence of stringently enforced, multi-layered regulation has helped combat the stereotypical link (in some times and places, well earned) that ties gambling to organized crime.  Such regulation serves a dual function: first, it ensures that tempting practices like skimming cash or bribing officials are minimized, while helping guarantee that the character of those employed by casinos are thoroughly screened. Second, it provides some degree of transparency, and thus legitimacy.  This emphasis on stringent regulation has been especially key to the acceptance of Indian gaming, which is now the most regulated gambling industry in the world.  By contrast, internet gambling has been castigated for its relative lack of regulation.
	A potential fourth factor also deserves mention. While perhaps not as critical as the first three, diversification has also been instrumental in garnering acceptance for gambling, especially casino-based gambling.  Throughout history, casinos have been paired with spas, hotels, restaurants, stage shows and other forms of entertainment,​[84]​ perhaps borrowing from these more legitimated sources of pleasure to dilute the stigma associated with gambling.  Today, this is evident in the mega-entertainment destinations of Atlantic City and Las Vegas. Both are increasingly catering to non-gamblers as well as gamblers with lavish stage shows, upscale dining establishments, luxurious spas, and expansive convention facilities.​[85]​ This trend can also be seen with respect to many tribal governments, such as the Morongo Band of Mission Indians, Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, and Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians in California, who have diversified their casino profits to open additional on-and-off reservation enterprises. Notably, it is expected that the next big thing for tribal casinos will be opening business conference facilities, a practice that has already played a major role in the transformation of Las Vegas from “sin city” to “entertainment capital of the world.”​[86]​  How this last factor may play out in an internet context has yet to be seen.
c.	A Comparison of Two Sub-Categories of Gambling: Indian Gaming versus Internet Gambling
A comparison of Internet gambling with Indian gaming illustrates how these factors dictate the degree of gambling acceptance.  This comparison also suggests, through the incredible divergence in the federal government’s approach to Indian and Internet gambling, that such policy is not morally driven, since morality would be a factor common to both industries.
i.	Indian Casinos 
The story of Indian gaming begins with the extreme poverty of many United States tribal governments.​[87]​ By the mid-20th century, the majority of tribes had been relegated to reservations on largely undesirable land located far from the beaten track.  Tribes quickly learned that making a livelihood was difficult on the often poor and remote territories to which they had been confined.  A lack of ability to obtain bank financing for economic development, due in part to bank concerns that tribes could not be sued in case of default due to their sovereign immunity, hindered their ability to establish economic infrastructures.  Further, the lack of land available to be used as collateral for bank loans (since reservations are generally held in trust by the federal government), combined with the relatively little foot traffic coming near reservation properties to cause most attempts at industry to fail. ​[88]​
By the early-1980s, a handful of tribes had turned to bingo to stimulate economic growth on their tribal lands. Bingo was able to do what other projects had not: lure surrounding community members onto reservations to spend money.  States, which still generally subscribed to anti-gambling policies—with exceptions primarily for government lotteries or charitable purposes—tried to make tribes subject to their generally-restrictive gambling laws.  Tribes refused to assent to state jurisdiction, noting that as sovereign governments they were generally immune from state regulation.​[89]​  
This dispute came to a head in the 1987 United States Supreme Court Case of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.​[90]​  The Supreme Court held that California tribes were not subject to states’ gambling laws: only the federal government had jurisdiction over tribes, so unless Congress had delegated their authority, states were barred from imposing their laws on reservation lands.​[91]​  California argued that just such a delegation had been made with the passage of Public Law 280, an act that gave states broad criminal control but limited civil regulatory control over reservations.  Therefore, the Court had to determine whether gambling was primarily civil or criminal in character.  Because California permitted gambling, most prominently in the form of a state lottery, the Court found that gambling did not violate the state’s public policy, and thus was a civil/regulatory issue.  Accordingly, the Court found that Congress had not delegated its authority with respect to gaming on Indian lands.​[92]​
The second major issue the Court considered was whether federal Indian law preempted state gambling law.​[93]​ The Court decided that the appropriate test for preemption would be to balance the federal, state, and tribal interests.  The Court found that the federal and tribal interests were the same: to foster economic diversification and development on Indian reservations.​[94]​  The state interest in limiting the potential infiltration of organized crime onto Indian casinos was believed less credible, especially since the state did not provide any facts to demonstrate present criminal involvement.​[95]​
The states were outraged at their lack of say in the future of Indian gambling, and began lobbying Congress.​[96]​ Just one year later, in 1988, Congress passed IGRA, which created the National Indian Gaming Commission to increase federal oversight of tribal casinos.​[97]​  Even more importantly, it required that tribes enter into agreements (called compacts) with states that would outline the agreed-to parameters of gambling on reservations,​[98]​ a requirement that has been broadly criticized by tribes and Federal Indian law scholars as a severe infringement of tribal sovereignty.  The one “stick” the tribes were permitted was the authority to require states to negotiate compacts in good faith.​[99]​  However, it was not long before tribes found out that the stick they had been awarded was a broken one.  
In the years following IGRA’s passage, several tribes tried repeatedly to enter into negotiations with their states, but were unable to get the necessary governors to come to the table.​[100]​  Eventually, this dispute erupted in a second Supreme Court showdown: in 1996, the Supreme Court held, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,​[101]​ that Congress had no authority to abrogate states’ 11th amendment immunity from suit without states’ express consent.  This essentially eviscerated the tribes’ ability to sue states for a bad faith refusal to negotiate gaming agreements, essentially binding tribes to IGRA, but exempting the states.  
Many tribes were furious.  The judicial, executive and legislative branches had collectively undermined their efforts to develop their struggling economies. As a result, several tribes banded together and decided to pitch their case to the fourth branch of government: the people.  
The story of what happened in California is illustrative of much of what next occurred.  Tribes pitched a proposal to voters in the form of an initiative, Proposition 5: The Tribal Government Gaming and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act.​[102]​  The Act featured a model compact that would go into effect after thirty days if the governor refused to negotiate a gaming agreement with a tribe.  The initiative was opposed by an ironic yet powerful coalition of forces: Las Vegas and California commercial gambling interests, organized labor, religious conservatives, and the governor.  The campaign became the then-most expensive non-presidential campaign in United States history.  By some accounts, as much as $200 million was collectively spent on the campaign.​[103]​  
The initiative passed by a landslide 63 percent on November 3, 1998.​[104]​  However, while there was a momentary sense that things were finally changing for the tribes, opponents almost immediately sued in court.
The California Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union [HERE] v. Davis​[105]​ less than a year later.  The main argument put forth by HERE was that Proposition 5 allowed gambling that was illegal under the state constitution. The Supreme Court agreed, despite a moving dissent by Justice Kennard. This dealt tribes a resounding blow.  However, Gray Davis, California’s new governor, had noticed the extreme public support that had been demonstrated for Indian gambling with the passage of Proposition 5.  He agreed to meet with a number of tribes to negotiate a compact and support a new initiative that could be presented to voters as a state constitutional amendment.  When the people of California voted in April 2000, the show of support for tribal gaming was even greater: the constitutional amendment passed by 65 percent.​[106]​  The amendment authorized the governor to enter into compacts with tribes subject to ratification by the legislature, and allowed tribes to have a virtual state-wide monopoly on slot machine gaming.  In addition, it set up a revenue sharing fund to aid nongaming tribes, as well as a special distribution fund that gave a percentage of tribal gaming proceeds to the state.​[107]​  While some have argued that the special distribution fund operated as an illegal state tax in contravention of IGRA, others have explained it away as consideration for the tribal monopoly on slot machines.  Regardless, it has become a necessary evil; following Seminole, it is the only means tribes have to entice states to enter into compacts.  The stick awarded in Cabazon had ultimately been swapped for a carrot.
Today, Indian casinos generate more than $26 billion annually as compared with $34 billion for commercial casinos.​[108]​  Yet Indian gaming is growing faster than commercial gaming: many experts predict that revenue from tribal casinos will exceed that of commercial gaming by 2013.​[109]​  According to the National Indian Gaming Association, there are now more than 560 federally-recognized tribes in the United Sates, 225 of which run Class II or Class III casino gaming operations.  More than 420 gaming facilities are in operation across 28 states.​[110]​  Tribes employ approximately 670,000 individuals at their casinos, 75 percent of whom are non-Indian, 25 percent of whom are Indian.  These latter numbers shift dramatically in areas of high unemployment, though, where as many as 80 percent of tribal gaming employees are Native American.​[111]​  Thanks to these statistics, tribal gaming has become economically invaluable to many local, county, state and tribal economies.
An important exercise suggests that tribal gaming is most likely a product of a changed national consensus around gambling.  If the Cabazon case had made it to the Supreme Court in 1951 instead of 1987,​[112]​ gambling probably would have been found to be a criminal issue and not civil/regulatory.  This is for two reasons: first, gambling would have been viewed as a greater risk due to its recent, highly-publicized affiliations with organized crime.  Second, federal Indian policy at that time was focused on the assimilation (and thus the elimination) of tribes, not their self-sufficiency.  By contrast, when Cabazon was decided in 1987, then-President Ronald Reagan had shifted federal policy towards encouraging tribal economic independence from federal government.  This political context is critical to understanding why tribes were able to secure such a momentous achievement in the 1980s.  Not only did the Cabazon victory follow on the heels of the civil rights movement generally and the efforts of the American Indian Movement more specifically, but for once tribal goals had aligned with federal interests. 
Further, as early as 1950, the Kefauver Committee had suggested that the concern behind conceptualizing gambling as a vice did not stem from the practice of gambling itself, but its regulation or lack thereof.​[113]​ Thus, if gambling could be regulated at the tribal, state and federal level, as IGRA mandates, the national hunger for gambling could be met in a way that minimized concerns of fraud or criminal infiltration.
There is also evidence that the state’s policy on gambling changed during that time period.  In 1992, California’s office of Planning and Research decried the “enormous subsidy that Californians provide to Nevada through their gambling patronage.” ​[114]​ In a special report, the office noted that billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs were flooding out of state each year thanks to Nevada’s western gambling monopoly, which, by then, was well established.​[115]​  At the time, the state was experiencing economic difficulties; it was particularly important to keep both jobs and money in California. This further suggests there were numerous practical incentives to expand gambling by permitting geographically bounded, highly regulated, and government-purpose gaming on reservations.  
Thus, political, economic and social factors had all come together to prime the law for the promotion of tribal gaming.
ii.	Internet Gambling and the New Frontier
Internet gambling is the latest sub-industry to explode, although it has experienced a very different legal and policy trajectory.  This is especially evidenced by the relatively recent passage of the UIGEA, which has been touted as ushering in the “prohibition era” of Internet gambling.​[116]​  Contrasting this sub-field with Indian gaming supports the theory that regulation, geography, and charitable/government purposes are all critical to the development of gambling policy, as well as the decriminalization of gambling more generally.
In addition to being the youngest and (perhaps) wildest child of the gambling industry, online gaming is least restricted by the three factors listed above.  Ironically, the feature that makes Internet gambling so appealing is also the feature that makes Americans most nervous: the fact that it reaches, quite literally, not only into one’s backyard, but one’s very home.  Thus, unlike Indian gaming, which is largely confined to reservations, or commercial casino gambling, which is tied to isolated districts within specific cities, Internet gambling is the preeminent example of gambling without geographic borders. 
Indeed, while Indian reservations provided a new geographic frontier for gambling, cyberspace has provided an entirely new dimension.  Currently, Internet gambling is estimated to have an annual worth of $18 to 20 billion; 50 to 70 percent of Internet gambling-related revenue—worldwide—comes from United States citizens.​[117]​  While online gambling is still only one third the size of the casino industry, online gaming has the potential to expand at a mind-boggling rate thanks to the enormous number of households it can reach.  
Another explanation for America’s relatively negative policy stance toward Internet gambling might be explained by its source.  Much as with illegal narcotics, most suppliers of Internet gambling come from outside the country; thus, profits rapidly stream out of state.  Similar bleeding was one of the major reasons Californians changed their historically anti-gambling stance to pass Propositions 5 and 1A: there was broad recognition that citizens were going to gamble anyway, and that those proceeds were better kept in-state than allowed to continue to flow into Nevada. 
The U.S. government has tried to stop this hemorrhaging with anti-Internet gambling laws, much as it once tried to dampen casino activities through the passage of law. For a while, there was a raging international debate about whether the laws of the supplying country or the laws of the player’s country controlled whether internet gambling was illegal; European nations tended to argue that the controlling perspective was the country from which gambling originated; in the United States, the answer was unclear.​[118]​  Now, however, with the passage of the UIGEA, the United States perspective is that it is both: Internet gambling is illegal if illegal in either jurisdiction.
Behnam Dayanim has provided an excellent overview of the hodgepodge of laws that the Untied States tried to weave together to restrict Internet gambling prior to passage of the UIGEA.​[119]​  According to Dayanim, most of these laws were created prior to broad-based Internet access, and thus were not adequately designed to constrain Internet gambling.  For example, before the UIGEA, one needed to violate the Wire Act​[120]​ (which some argued only applied to online sports betting) or violate state law in order to be held accountable for providing online gaming.  However, following passage of the UIGEA, it is illegal to receive a bet from anyone within any state or tribal land if it is “unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”​[121]​  Exceptions are made for any Internet gambling that is solely 1) intrastate activity; 2) between Indian reservations; or 3) that involves the Interstate Horseracing Act.​[122]​
So what issues control policy with respect to the future of Internet gambling?  In the United Kingdom, the Budd Report lays out three key objectives for gambling laws: 1) to ensure that games are free of crime, honest, and conducted according to regulation; 2) to ensure that players get what they expect and are not exploited; and 3) to ensure that children and other “vulnerable populations” are protected.​[123]​  The United Kingdom has also identified three potential policy choices: 1) to maintain the status quo; 2) to push for greater enforcement in the form of an international crackdown; or 3) to permit regulated and taxed gaming (as has essentially occurred with Indian gaming in the United States and with Internet gambling overseas).​[124]​
While the UIGEA’s passage suggests that the United States, from a policy perspective, has chosen option two (greater enforcement), a closer examination of the Act’s passage suggests current policy is really closer to option one (maintaining the status quo).  Further consideration of history and context, however, suggest even that policy choice may soon transform into option three (greater regulation and taxation), as explained below.
On its face, the UIGEA seems to reflect federal policy leaning toward greater enforcement—hence the title “Gambling Enforcement Act.”  Meanwhile, the argument in favor of the status quo has to do with the history of both the Act’s passage and its relative lack of enforcement.  First, the UIGEA was quietly passed as an amendment to the SAFE Port Act.​[125]​ Most members of the Senate-House Conference Committee did not even read the bill’s final language,​[126]​ suggesting the salience of Internet gambling was minimal.​[127]​  Additionally, there are numerous calls to overturn the Act.​[128]​  In terms of the Act’s substance, the UIGEA maintains the states as the locus of policy creation and control: the Act merely makes violation of state policy a federal violation, underscoring the continuation of current policy.  Further, the Act’s enforcement has been essentially nonexistent; even the deadline for setting regulations to carry out the Act’s mandates expired with no action taken.​[129]​  
Why else is it unlikely that the United Sates will choose policy two, pushing for greater enforcement or an international crackdown? First, there are potential free trade issues involved in limiting the ability of overseas institutions to provide Internet gambling for United States citizens.  For example, Antigua has contended that United States restrictions on offshore Internet gambling violate U.S. commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).​[130]​  The WTO agreed that the United States had been unfairly protectionist because the United States makes an exception to its anti-Internet gambling laws for horseracing​[131]​ (an argument that finds a parallel in the Indian gaming Cabazon court decision, where the United States Supreme Court decided that states could not forbid Indian gambling since they provided exceptions to their general anti-gambling laws for their own state lotteries).  While the United States has arguably never been that concerned with violating GATS, persistent flaunting of international agreements will likely be minimized under the Obama administration, especially since one platform of that administration has been to improve the United States’ international accountability.
Option two is also potentially dangerous because it threatens to encourage criminal infiltration, much as happened with the Prohibition of alcohol in the United States and the pervasive criminalization of casino gambling in the first half of the 20th century.  Already, thanks to passage of the UIGEA, most publicly traded international Internet gambling providers have stopped allowing participation by United States citizens. By contrast, many private gambling providers have not.​[132]​  This suggests that Internet gambling, which is probably unstoppable, will become even harder to regulate because it will become less transparent: this will establish the precise conditions under which organized crime has flourished in the past.
It appears that the biggest concern for the United States has been the difficulty in policing Internet gambling, and thus meeting the three key objectives of protecting youth, ensuring transparency in gambling operations, and keeping online gambling free of crime.  However, there is reason to believe this concern is exaggerated.  Credit cards and association cards have established policies to not accept online gambling (or any gambling) debts—not necessarily for any moral reason, but because they do not want to be stuck holding the bag if the gambling proves illegal.​[133]​  While gambling vendors can fairly easily circumscribe the codes that would indicate gambling to credit card merchants, Europe has had some success in regulating gambling, and models used overseas may be well worth exploring.  
Further, the potential upside, economically, is enormous.  For example, European countries have found that government monopolies on Internet sports betting can generate huge fees for nations, providing an alternative model to raising taxes. Especially in a time of national recession, it is unlikely the U.S. will want to continue to allow gambling funds to drain out of the country.
Finally, while the general consensus in the United States has been that online betting is especially pernicious due to its accessibility, some have argued it is no more dangerous than betting in casinos, and in fact, may be less so.  First, there are more recreational than problem users betting online, which means the degree of potential harm is proportionately small.  As mentioned above, less than one percent of the nation (0.8%) is a lifetime pathological gambler.​[134]​  Although problem gambling can certainly devastate individuals and their families, the overall rate of addiction is much smaller than with many practices (like consuming alcohol) that are currently legal and regulated. Second, online gamblers generally have to fill out user profiles, unlike many casino gamblers who can gamble anonymously; this registration process can facilitate the tracking of problem gamblers, as well as provide a means to enhance regulation.​[135]​  Third, some have argued the casino environment, as a whole, is more addictive than online gaming, as it provides a desired social outlet, similar to bars, movie theaters, and other entertainment venues.​[136]​
For all of these reasons, I believe it is likely the United States will consider borrowing models from overseas and begin to engage in greater exploration of the potential benefits of regulating online gambling, as opposed to ensuring its illegality.  
IV.	Summary and Conclusion
United States policy toward Indian gaming and Internet gambling has diverged, and done so dramatically.  In this paper, I have argued that this is due to differences that exist around three key factors that ameliorate American worries regarding gambling.  First, as suggested above, to lessen moral and general anxiety, gambling must be geographically limited.  Confining Indian gaming to reservations helps assuage this general concern.  The heightened panic that generally comes when landless tribes attempt to take land into trust outside of existing reservations for gambling purposes supports this argument.​[137]​  By contrast, online gambling seems geographically limitless, existing wherever one has access to the Internet.
Second, gambling must be highly regulated to assuage corruption fears.  Indian gambling is the most heavily regulated industry in the United States, with tribal, state and federal oversight.  For example, in California, tribal gaming is regulated by individual tribal governments, by the California Gambling Commission, the National Indian Gaming Commission, the FBI and the BIA.  By contrast, the federal government has repeatedly framed Internet gambling as almost impossible to regulate, despite relative success overseas.
Third, gambling receives its greatest acceptance when a portion of proceeds accrues for charitable or government purposes.  Under IGRA, tribal gaming profits are dedicated to developing tribal government economies and charitable contributions;​[138]​ such funds have drastically reduced welfare payments on many gaming reservations and provided enhanced self-sufficiency for numerous tribal governments.  By contrast, most Internet gambling profits not only line private pockets, but line international private pockets, draining money from the United States. This last point is particularly relevant to predictions regarding the future of Internet gambling. Losing crucial jobs and revenue is especially unpalatable during difficult economic times.  If gambling is inevitable, as history suggests, states may increasingly try to find ways to keep gambling dollars within their borders.  This prediction is supported by the historic spread of lotteries in the U.S., which was often triggered as a response to keep money in-state when gamblers crossed state lines.  
So where is gambling policy likely to head?  At the time that this paper is being drafted, the United States is in the midst of a recession.  This suggests to me that gambling is likely to enjoy increased decriminalization and regulation over the next decade, as governments increasingly find ways to harness gaming to generate revenue.  This is particularly likely considering the current conservative reluctance to increase taxes, to which lotteries and other forms of government gaming have long been considered the alternative. 
What about the future of Internet gaming?  Industry opponents may well be waging a losing battle.  While the UIGEA was passed relatively recently, strict enforcement does not appear to be a realistic goal​[139]​ or to truly represent federal policy.  This is evident, in part, in the way in which the UIGEA was passed: as an amendment to another bill.  As technological advances increase that can boost confidence in the United States’ regulatory ability, an increase in the acceptance of Internet gambling is likely.  Already, the government concern with gambling seems to be less about gambling itself, than who is reaping the rewards.
I am not alone in my prediction that the demise of the UIGEA will come quickly.  In March 2009, an article asked “Is Internet Gambling Back on the Table?”​[140]​ Noting the efforts of Barney Frank, who has led the assault on the UIGEA as an attack on fundamental freedoms and an unfortunate echo of doomed prohibition policies of the 1920s and 1930s, the author predicted that the UIGEA will be overturned by the end of 2009 or soon thereafter.​[141]​  Online poker players have joined the fight, arguing that what the U.S. needs is not a ban on internet gambling, but greater regulation, to increase player protection.  According to a spokesman for the Safe and Secure Internet Gambling Initiative, “Right now, it’s the Wild West.”  
According to comScore Media Metrix, online gambling is the ninth fastest-growing internet industry.  Other entities have underscored the fiscal benefits of legalizing and regulating such a fast-growing industry: for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers has estimated that the United States could now raise approximately 22 percent more from regulating and taxing Internet gambling than it could in 2007, due to the enormous growth of online gambling that has occurred, even despite the ban.  The Financial Times has similarly reported that $17 billion was generated in worldwide annual gross win​[142]​ from online gambling.​[143]​  Gross wins from mobile sources, alone, such as mobile phones, is expected to exceed $1 billion by 2012.  There are predictions that European operators will soon breach the North American divide by infiltrating the Canadian market, bringing online gambling even closer to home.
Finally, gambling has a very real place in the American ethic. While Americans have a love-hate relationship with speculation,​[144]​ gambling is a better ideological mate for the United States than perhaps any other nation in the world. As the penultimate capitalistic society, the U.S. has long embraced risk: this was demonstrated in the 19th century when land and gold speculation consumed the nation like a fever.  In more recent decades, the stock market, America’s major engine for economic growth, has been repeatedly analogized to gambling.​[145]​ The phrase “casino capitalism” makes this link explicit. As Alexis de Tocqueville once noted regarding the fundamental connection between gambling and democracy: “Those living in the instability of a democracy have the constant image of chance before them, and, in the end, they come to like all those projects in which chance plays a part … not only because of the promise of profit but because they like the emotions evoked.”​[146]​ Further, that there is now a world series of poker (ESPN even has a show dedicated to the game) suggests gambling has begun to be viewed as an American “sport” as opposed to a vice, and thus as a destigmatized form of entertainment.
What could turn the tide away from the increased legalization of gambling? Notably, our Puritanistic roots decry the making of money from nonproductive sources.  The image of the American as a risk taker, one who is able to catapult over class distinctions through luck and pluck, contrasts with the notion of the U.S. as comprised of hard workers who sweat their way to the top.  Lynn Stout has discussed the prevalence of antispeculation rules in American law, giving weight to this latter perspective.  She notes Congress’ general pattern of discouraging short-term speculation in favor of long-term “investment.”​[147]​  Further, history suggests that either a) a major scandal​[148]​ or b) gaming that bleeds beyond its approved geographic and/or regulatory boundaries could inspire a pushback.  For example, if the cause of our current recession is framed as due to excessive speculation, we may well witness a slow turning of the tide.  
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